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Sabdapramana as a Theological Category in 
Vedanta Desika's Tattvamuktäkaläpa
Sucharita Adluri
Abstract: This article considers the Sravaisnava theologian Vedanta Desika's 
(14th-century CE) understanding of sabdapramana and deference to 
sabdapramana that is evident in one of his most important expositions the 
Tattvamuktakalapa and its commentary the Sarvarthasiddhi. For Desika, 
deference to sabdapramana is motivated by belief in a particular view of 
reality. This would be the acceptance of Visnu as the Brahman of the upa- 
nisads, his connection to authoritative scripture, and its propagation. 
Furthermore, to defer to sabdapramana requires membership in a community 
and the requisite pedagogical training that confers the authority needed to 
speak for the tradition.
In the context of Indian darsana-s reliance on scripture (sabdapramana) is decisive 
in arguments of soteriological import. Other epistemological categories like per­
ception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumana) though valid, ultimately defer to the 
contents of the Veda on issues of metaphysics and ontology. But what does com­
mitment to sabdapramana mean? One way to assess this is by examining intellec­
tual discourse that relies on scripture to evaluate the scope of sacred texts in 
theological argumentation. That is, an investigation of theological reasoning 
through examples that illustrate reliance on scripture. Another avenue of inquiry 
is to examine the motivations and qualifications on which deference to 
sabdapramana is predicated. This article is concerned with the latter issue. 
Examining the discussion of the category of sabdapramana, in a Sanskrit text of 
Vedanta Desika (14th-century CE), a proponent of Visixbadvaita Vedanta, this art­
icle poses and answers the following questions—‘what does deference to 
sabdapramana mean for Desika?' ‘What criteria characterize his commitment to 
scripture?' Such an examination, however, does not imply that there is a mono- 
lithic understanding of reliance on scripture.The present discussion on the nature 
of one's reliance on scripture is limited to the context of theological discourse or
sastraic discourse since a practitioner's engagement and understanding of commit­
ment to sαbdαprαmα>α may intersect and/or diverge from that of a theologian. 
For Desika, reliance on sabdapramana, in the Tattvamuktakalapa (TMK), first and 
foremost implies an understanding and acceptance of a set of views about the 
supreme deity ViX>u's role as the primal teacher. Second, deference to 
sabdapram@>a presupposes membership in a religious community. Third, commit­
ment to and reliance on scripture require extensive pedagogical training. Thus, 
deference to sabdapramana is a collective endeavour and not the undertaking of a 
lone individual. Beginning with a discussion on Sravaisnava theology of which 
Desika was a proponent, this article examines each of the three criteria that 
inform his understanding of deference to scripture.
Sravaisnava theology
The Sravaisnavas of South India revere the deity Visnu-Narayana and his consort 
Sra. Beginning with Nathamuni (9th-century CE), who is considered to be the first 
important proponent, the Sravaisnava tradition (sampradaya) undergoes a complex 
development of synthesising and systematising the hymns of the Tamil Alvar 
saints, the Sanskrit tradition of Vedanta, and Pancaratra. The Srivaisnava inter­
pretation of Vedanta called Visistadvaita Vedanta1 articulated by Nathamuni and 
then Yamuna (10th-century CE) was further developed by Ramanuja (1077-1157 
CE), who is said to have systematised this type of Vedanta. Subsequently, Vedanta 
Desika (14th-century CE) consolidates Ramanuja's teachings, defends Visistadvaita 
against the criticisms of rival schools of thought, and is recognised as one of its 
leading exponents. The primary source for this study is the TMK the most import­
ant exposition of Desika along with his commentary, the Sarvarthasiddhi (SS). In its 
scope, the TMK as an exposition of Visistadvaita principles is encyclopaedic. In 
fact, Desika states that the purpose of this composition is to establish the doctrines 
of Vedanta based on a critical evaluation of teachings advocated by rival schools of 
thought,2 and that it is an exhaustive treatise for ‘what is not treated here is not 
found elsewhere'.3 We may construe from this that the TMK was intended for 
Visixbadvaita theologians and perhaps theologians of rival schools, that is, those 
engaged in sastraic discourse. In fact, the Srivaisnava tradition defines the 
Sarvarthasiddhi, the commentary on TMK, as an intellectual shield to defend oneself 
from the onslaught of outsiders.4
The TMK, which comprises five hundred verses in the srgdhara metre, is divided 
into five sections, which are like the strands of the pearl necklace (muktakalapa) 
that is the text itself. The five strands (sara) cover topics salient to Visistadvaita 
Vedanta, namely, substance (dravya), individual soul (jfva), Brahman (isvara), epis­
temology (buddhi), and metaphysical attributes (adravya).5 Scripture and its use as 
valid means of knowledge (pramana) of Brahman is addressed in the fourth section 
titled buddhisara (the knowledge strand) in verses 114-123.6 Here, Desika begins by 
differentiating the Veda from extra-Vedic texts, considers the validity of smrti as a
basic component of sabdapramana, and concludes with an evaluation of particular 
smpti traditions, such as the purana, Pasupata, Samkhya, and Pañcaratra. What is 
apparent in this discussion is not only what Desika considers as sabdapramana, but 
also what he means by reliance on sabdapramana. That is, according to Desika, a 
claim such as, ‘I defer to scripture', in the context of commentarial and exegetical 
pursuits, entails a particular cognitive orientation, religious affiliation, and 
specialised training. Each of these three criteria is examined in the following 
sections.
Visnu and sabdapramana
Deference to Sabdapramana implies an ontological framework. According to 
Visixbadvaita, it is the understanding and acceptance that Visnu, the Brahman 
of the upanisads is the cause of world production, preservation, and dissolution 
and exists in a soul-body relationship with his creation. For Desika and other 
Visistadvaitins, Visnu also promulgates the Veda and various smrti traditions, 
which comprise the Srivaisnava scriptural canon. This section follows some of 
Desika's arguments on the validity of sruti, and smrti traditions such as puranas 
and pancaratra, in some detail to illustrate that deference to Sabdapramana pre­
sumes the acceptance of a particular set of views about ViX>u's role in the per­
petuation and propagation of scripture. In other words, to properly defer to 
scripture implies an understanding of ViX>u as the source of all valid scripture 
in one sense or another.
Ramanuja,7 Desika's predecessor, describes the function of scripture as follows: 
‘therefore, sastra alone is your pramana in determining what is to be done and what 
is not, in determining what is to be accepted and what is not. The Veda augmented 
(upabpmhita) by the dharmasastras, itihasas, and puranas, teach only the highest 
reality called Purusottama, his pleasing form and the actions that are the means to 
attain Him.'8 Desika, too, highlights these characteristics of Veda to invoke it as the 
organising principle differentiating Vedic and extra-Vedic traditions.9
The use of Veda as a measure of orthodoxy (vedam+la)10 is based on its author- 
less-ness (apauruseyatva) and its eternality (nityatva). Deliberations on these attri­
butes of the Veda were first undertaken by Mimamsa in the context of sacrifice 
and the ritual implication of language. These speculations were later translated 
into the context of the exegetical tradition ofVedanta.11 Although there may seem 
to be similarities to the Mimamsa conception of Veda as authorless and eternal, 
there are major differences.12 On the one hand, ‘the Veda is authorless and eternal 
because it is being uttered in that very order, which is remembered by an impres­
sion generated in the order in which it has been uttered again and again previ- 
ously.'13 On the other hand, Visixbadvaita also takes great pains to describe the 
manifestation (aviskr) of Veda by Visnu.
Characteristic of Vedanta, Visixbadvaita subscribes to the periodic dissolution 
and production of the world. However, even within this scenario, the Veda is still 
authorless and eternal. Ramanuja explains—
when a [great] dissolution14 comes to an end, the Blessed One, the supreme 
Person, remembers the previous configuration of the world, and having 
resolved, ‘Let me be many', he diversifies [into individual entities] the whole 
aggregate of enjoyable [i.e. non-conscious beings] and their enjoyers [i.e. con­
scious beings], previously collapsed in himself as but his residual power. Having 
created as old the Mahat etc [i.e. the cosmic material principle(s)] and the 
Brahma-Egg [or universe itself] right up to Hira>yagarbha, and having mani­
fested the Vedas in their traditional order, he imparts them as before to 
Hira>yagarbha, instructing him as to the production of the world and compris­
ing the forms of gods etc., while he himself remains as its inner self.15
The Veda rooted in Brahman's essence manifests in the same order from epoch to 
epoch and therefore authorless and eternal. ViX>u imparts the Veda to Brahma 
(Hiranyagarbha/Prajapati), in the same order as before and following this, the 
Vedic seers directly perceive or experience the Veda and reproduce and transmit 
them unaltered. To defer to the Veda implies an understanding and an acceptance 
of the role of Visnu in the process of Vedic transmission. Desika does not mention 
all this detail in the TMK, however, as a follower of Ramanuja, he subscribes to this 
scenario of ViX>u's role in evoking, manifesting, and transmitting the Veda which 
‘reposes' within His consciousness.16 While the role of Visnu in the propagation of 
Veda is implied in Desika's discussion as he is more concerned with refuting the 
PrabhakarasandNaiyayikas,inthediscussionofthevalidityofsmrti,heisexplicit 
in scripture's connection to ViX>u.
As Visnu's essence, the Veda is authorless, eternal, and beyond the vicissitudes 
of matter (pradhana), but smrti, which is authored by various sages is susceptible to 
the three qualities (guna) of matter (sattva, rajas, and tamas). Desika begins with 
some general arguments as to why smrti is a valid means of knowledge of Visnu. 
He claims that generally, smpti are declared as equal (samana) to Veda17 by sruti, 
eminent teachers, and smrti texts themselves. Thus smrti's validity is rooted in 
sruti. Also, both smrti and sruti are said to have the same soteriological goals 
(prayojana). This goal that is shared by both types of scripture is of course liber­
ation, which is the soul's experience of eternal bliss as defined in the Sravaisnava 
context. Subsequently, Desika begins his discussion of the puranas by stating the 
first rule in the categorisation of smrti, in Vedanta traditions—if contradiction 
with Veda is seen, smrti is rejected as is established by the commentaries on 
Brahma Sutras.18 For puranas he notes
similarly, this rule applies to the beginning of puranas due to the possibility 
that there could be human errors. If however, there is a contradiction between
the puranas, the order of validity/rule of strength would depend on the division 
such as sattvika and so on.19
Puranas that are contradictory to sruti are invalid, but the hierarchy among vari­
ous puranas is evaluated based on a classification mentioned in the Matsya Purana, 
which accords the highest authority to Vaisnava puranas since they are thought to 
be sattvika in nature.20 The rationale is that after Visnu creates Brahma, in epochs 
when the latter's sattva dominates he praises Visnu, in epochs when his rajas 
dominates; he praises Agni and Siva, and when his tamas dominates he praises 
himself. In the mixed epochs the goddess Sarasvati and the Manes are praised. 
Although the propagator of the puranas may be Brahma, as an embodied being 
comprised of pradhana and its three guna constituents, he cannot escape their 
effect. However, since the puranas that revere Visnu are composed when his 
sattva guna dominates, they are the most authoritative.
Although Desika, here, does not reject the various puranas as contrary to the 
Veda, he does validate the Vainsava ones as most authoritative, especially if there 
is a mutual contradiction among these puranas. The classification of puranas, 
which is the same as that of Ramanuja, articulates allegiance to Visistadvaita 
Vedanta and reads the supremacy of Visnu, the Brahman of the upanisads, into 
the categorisation of sectarian puranas. The rationalisation as to why rival puranas 
are not valid is ultimately an ontological issue; it is the nature of Visnu's creation. 
Smrti texts as authored texts cannot escape the influence of pradhana and are 
inherently prone to errors and faults. Visnu, however, does provide an alternative 
in the form of Vaisnava puranas that are purely sattvika in nature and thus escape 
the effects of the other two qualities of pradhana, rajas and tamas. Visnu does not 
promulgate the puranas, but as the sole object of praise of the sattvika-minded 
Brahma, and as the eminent object of praise of the Vaisnava puranas his connec­
tion to them is significant. Commitment to sabdapramana thus includes knowledge 
of and acceptance of Visnu's connection to the most authoritative of puranas.
The discussion of Pancaratra's validity shares some similarities to the purana 
debate in that these texts also, since they are authored by embodied beings are 
susceptible to the deleterious effects of pradhana. While the argument for the 
validity of Vaisnava puranas is based on the sattvika nature of Brahma, Desika 
utilises different principles in his refutation of arguments contra- Pancaratra. 
The reception of smrti traditions such as Samkhya, Yoga, Pasupata, and 
Pancaratra, by other darsana-s has been varied. Kumarila in his Tantravarttika for 
instance, denounces these traditions as extra-Vedic, though not completely out­
side the bounds of Vedic tradition like Buddhism and Jainism.21 The Mahabharata 
(MBh) deems Samkhya, Yoga, and Pañcaratra as smrti traditions that are read 
together with the Veda.22 The Brahma Sutras, one of the foundational texts of 
Ved@nta reject Sa:khya and Yoga,23 while Pancaratra's status within Vedanta24 
is complex, as the interpretations of Sankara and Ramanuja differ vastly. Of these
smrti traditions, it is only Pancaratra that has been adopted into the Vedantic fold 
primarily because of Vaisnava Vedanta.
To be sure there are doctrinal differences on the presentation of the highest 
reality (tattva) within Samkhya, Yoga, and Pancaratra, but ultimately for Desika, 
Pancaratra is valid because it has been taught by Visnu-Narayana himself. In re­
gards Samkhya and Yoga he claims,
due to excessive errors, on account of pradhana, there would be doubt of some
good people; read together with sruti, by logic they are not to be refuted, but 
the contradiction with sruti is not removed25
Thus, according to him, the MBh is right to advocate their acceptability from the 
point of view of reason and logic. However, these texts are not fully Vedic because of 
the sheer number of contradictions to sruti, and so their validity must be rejected.
However, as a smrti tradition, Pancaratra too is similar to Samkhya and 
Pasupata and is not above the effects of pradhana. Desika's reasoning for 
Pañcaratra, now, focuses on the role of Visnu in its propagation and transmission. 
Pañcaratra is beyond these faults engendered by pradhana, a characteristic of au­
thored texts, but through devotees such as Pauskara and Sannilya, Visnu-Narayana 
himself, expounds the Pancaratra.26 This is similar to Krsna's role as the teacher of 
the Bhagavadgata (BhG). Furthermore, the sages who are the recipients of this 
teaching are characterised by sattva and hence above all faults that characterises 
association with pradhana.
Unlike Samkhya and Yoga, Pancaratra is authoritative because it is also part of 
Visnu's cosmic plan. In BhG 4.8, Krsna claims that he is born repeatedly for the 
protection of the good people, destruction of the wicked, and the establishment of 
dharma. Ramanuja commenting on this BhG verse notes that ‘good people' here 
refer to the best among the Vaisnavas (vaisnavagresara) who have taken refuge in 
Krsna.27 Desika echoes Ramanuja's interpretation of the BhG when he claims, ‘the 
activity or manifestation28 of Visnu-Narayana is two-fold-—for leading the asuras 
astray and for the protection of his followers. In regard to Pancaratra, the goal is 
for the protection of the good people and therefore those completely character­
ized by sattva such as Sandilya and so on, are themselves teachers of those texts.'29 
Although Desika does not specify what he means by ‘good people', I think 
Ramanuja's interpretation from BhG 4.8 can apply. He instructs sages on 
Pañcaratra to protect his devotees and since only teachers characterised by 
sattva are the mediators, this smrti tradition is above all faults. So, beginning 
with his role in the transmission of the Veda, as the auspicious object of the 
most authoritative of puranas, as a teacher in the BhG, and now in propounding 
the Pancaratra, Visnu is ever-present and persists in conveying different scrip­
tures to those who take refuge in him.30
In Desika's refutation of a last objection made by the purvapaksin on the inclu­
sion of Pancaratra as sabdapramana and the exclusion of Samkhya, Yoga, and
Pasupata, Visnu's special relationship to Pancaratra is underscored. The objector 
claims that since all doctrines (siddhanta) such as Samkhya, Yoga, and so on are 
concerned with the all-knowing Isvara's divine cognition, which is eternal, and 
‘because, all doctrines are manifested through Isvara; among these, how is 
Pancaratra different?'31 Desika replies that Pancaratra is superior to other smrti 
traditions ‘because it is spoken by bhagavan, because it is accepted by authoritative 
men (adhikari) such as Sannilya who are characterised by sattva, and because it is 
not contrary to the Veda, from these and for a hundred other reasons their dif­
ference is established'.32 The final justification, however, is that ‘Pancaratra be­
cause of its validity (pramanatva) abides in divine cognition while the other tantras 
abide in divine cognition due to their invalidity (apramanatva)'.33 ‘Because Isvara 
(Visnu) is all-knowing, Vedas and Buddhist texts and so on abide in his cognition 
equally. By this however, there is no similarity among them. It is the same case 
here as well, this is the intention.'34 Ultimately, though the all-knowing Visnu is 
cognisant of various traditions, he only holds Pancaratra as valid. Thus, these texts 
cannot be argued as valid on the mere basis of Visnu's awareness of them.
An examination of Desika's discussion, thus far, illustrates particular connec­
tions between Visnu and authoritative scripture in the Sravaisnava understanding 
of sabdapramana. Visnu imparts the Veda at the beginning of time through 
Prajapati, is linked to authoritative Vaisnava puranas as their sole object of 
praise, and now promulgates Pancaratra through worthy men such as Sandilya, 
and so on. These examples draw attention to some of the criteria on which com­
mitment to scripture is predicated. Deference to sabdapramana for Desika, implies a 
set of views on what scripture is and the relationship of Visnu to these texts. 
Whereas the understanding and acceptance of scripture discussed thus far may 
seem to be just a cognitive attitude, the practical dimensions of what it means to 
defer to scripture, according to Desika, are presented in the next two sections.
Religious community and sabdapramana
The second criterion implied in Desika's understanding of sabdapramana is mem­
bership in a community. Desika's discussion on the validity of Veda in relation to 
extra-Vedic texts underscores the connection between commitment to 
sabdapramana and religious affiliation. That is, according to Desika in the TMK, 
one properly defers to sabdapramana when one is a member of Vedic society, since 
that is the prerequisite for access to relevant scriptures. Elsewhere, Desika notes 
that ‘scripture and reason declare unanimously that the distinctions of varna and 
jati and the rules of conduct the sastras prescribe accordingly are still fully valid 
among Bhagavatas'.35 Such priority given to one's caste and the role of scripture in 
attaining liberation is a major doctrinal difference that leads to the Tenkalai- 
Vatakalai sectarian rift within Sravaisnavism in the 17th century.36 Nonetheless, 
even the Tenkalai sub-sect's appeal to the Tamil Alvar hymns rather than Sanskrit
scriptures does not preclude the importance of religious affiliation in connection 
with commitment to scripture.
In his discussion on the validity of sruti, Desika refutes the 10th-century lo­
gician, Udayana, author of the Nyayakusumanjali (NK).37 As one of the foremost 
proponents of Nyaya-Vaisesika theism, Udayana comprehensively treats sruti's 
validity in the context of a rational doctrine of Isvara. One of the arguments in 
the Nyaya defence of Veda's validity was that it was accepted by the mahajana.38 
Udayana and other logicians utilise the concept of mahajanaparigraha to infer 
that the Veda is the work of a trustworthy person.39 That is, the Veda is ac­
cepted by the mahajana (mahajanaparigraha) because they are the words of a 
trustworthy person, 'svara. For Udayana, mahajana constitutes not just the fol­
lowers of Vedic dharma, but exemplary men of other traditions as well. Although 
Udayana might seem more catholic in his interpretation of mahajana, he takes 
great pains to argue the difference between the mahajana who accept the Vedic 
tradition and those who adhere to extra-Vedic traditions.40 Desika rejects this 
interpretation of mahajana and it is this section of Udayana's Nyayakusumanjali 
that he references in the TMK. While for Udayana, the term mahajanaparigraha is 
primarily a corollary in establishing Isvara's authorship of the Veda, for Desika, 
acceptance by mahajana is a characteristic feature of Veda alone reflecting cer­
tain social distinctions.
Desika's interpretation of this term seems more restrictive in the sense that he 
understands it to refer solely to those who accept the Veda. Mahajana are adher­
ents of the Veda exclusively. He states that only men who are deliberate and wise41 
(preksavanto mahanta) accept this endless Veda along with its anga-s.42 Therefore, 
the claim that there is equality in the acceptance of Vedic texts and extra-Vedic 
texts does not hold. Neither does mahajanaparigraha mean acceptance by a great 
number of men, it only means acceptance by excellent men (bahujanapar- 
igrhitatvam na mahajanaparigraha api tu utkrststajanaparigraha). Moreover, the in­
tention is that, these wise men accept only the validity of the Veda (sa tu vedesu 
eva). For Desika, neither the Veda nor those who adhere to it can in anyway be 
compared to the followers of other traditions. Thus utkrsbajana employing the Veda 
as the standard do not expand or spread the extra-Vedic texts in the same way 
that they endlessly extend the Vedas because the latter are the limit or boundary 
beyond which they do not venture.43 So unlike Udayana, for whom mahajana may 
include wise men following even other traditions, for Desika, mahajana by defin­
ition can only mean those who accept the Veda.
So, why would unwise men (anutkrstajana) accept the validity of extra-Vedic 
texts? According to him, there are two types of acceptance (parigraha)—acceptance 
by someone who is supported by faith (kascid astikyanibandana) and the other, 
acceptance by someone because of the desire for trivial aims and goals 
(alpalapaprayojanabhilasad apara).44 Moreover, the fact that these men cling to 
goals that are unworthy or nastikya is also reflected in their other limitations. 
For an enumeration of these limitations, Desika summarises Udayana's discussion
on the differences between those who accept Veda and those who reject it. The 
mahajana who accept the Veda, he claims in the NK, are above all faults
Thus indolence etc (alasyadi) cannot account for the acceptance of the Veda; for 
it prescribes rites and other observances that are difficult to accomplish. Nor is 
the Veda accepted by persons to whom admission has been denied in other 
ways of life (such as Buddhism) having other agamas; for even those that are 
revered by other ways of life are not admitted as adherents of the Veda. 
Likewise, the acceptance of the Veda is not because of heedlessness of the 
distinction between lawful food and unlawful food and drinks; for the Veda 
precisely aims at establishing the distinction between the two and forbids the 
eating and drinking of certain things. The acceptance of the Veda cannot be 
due to an illusion resulting from the habit of false reasonings; for the Vedic 
observances extend even to children. It cannot be due to deception arising from 
association with heretics or imposters; for the Veda and its practices are trans­
mitted from father to son.45
Desika, too, notes that ‘limitations46 are seen in those who accept them (extra­
Vedic texts) such as—lack of a foundation, laxity in religious observances, delusion 
due to the infatuation with logic, and leniency in food and dress etc—contrary to 
what is in the Veda.'47 In his commentary on this verse he elaborates further on 
these impediments. The fact that the unwise lack a foundation means that they 
have no recourse to any other resource (ananyagati), especially the path of the 
Veda; they are lax in behaviour such as having contempt for rules that are en­
joined or prohibited (kartavyakartavyaniyama). They are trapped by the deceit of 
heretical teachings (parair vancana), the delusion due to the practice of false rea­
soning (kutarkabhyasavyamoha), and they are indulgent in food and dress etc 
(asanacchadanadisaukarya).
Desika's discussion of the concept of mahajanaprarigraha emphasises commit­
ment to the Veda as predicated on a particular social ethic. His interpretation of 
the term mahajana as utkrstajana discloses the issue of religious affiliation that is 
implied in the commitment to sabdapramana. The Veda and its soteriologic ethic, as 
interpreted by Desika, are only accessible to the twice-born that study and practice 
the Veda in a particular way. Thus, to defer to the Veda, as Desika understands it, 
in the TMK, is to participate in such a religious community.
Pedagogical training and sabdapramana
In addition to membership in a religious community deference to sabdapramana as 
exemplified in the TMK, requires specialised training. In the discussion on the 
concept of mahajana in the previous section, Desika refutes the argument of the 
10th-century logician, Udayana. To accomplish this requires in-depth knowledge 
of not only Visistadvaita but also the Nyaya view of sabdapramana. Fluency in such
matters is something accessible only to those trained to speak for the tradition and 
not simply a Srivaisnava practitioner. Deference to sabdapramana, according to 
Desika's TMK, is not simply an awareness of a list of scriptures that are considered 
authoritative. One who is capable of deferring to sabdapramana is also someone 
who is trained and knowledgeable to engage in apologetics and rule on disputed 
issues. The two examples in this section, illustrate the importance of pedagogical 
training for the proper application of sabdapramana. The context of the first illus­
tration is the issue of lost Vedic branches as it concerns certain rituals enjoined in 
smrti such as the astaka sraddha (funerary) rites, which are not referred to in any of 
the existent branches of the Veda. Thus, the presumption that all actions of 
Vaidikas are rooted in the Veda is questioned. Various traditions explain this 
issue by claiming either that the Vedic branches that mention those texts have 
been lost or that the existence of such a Veda must be inferred. The second 
example is taken from one of Desika's arguments on the validity of Pancaratra.
The controversy in regard to rites and rituals enjoined by smrti but that are not 
found in extant Veda has been dealt with differently by different traditions.48 
Desika in the TMK refutes the arguments of the Prabhakaras and Naiyayikas to 
establish the Visixbadvaita point of view. This argument is only sketched here, in 
brief, since it is really the implication of this argument that is of interest. For the 
Prabhakaras, the existence of sruti which form the basis of rites such as astaka are 
inferred. Meaning that, as in the present day, in previous times also, Vedic people 
were undertaking these rituals in accordance with previously existing smrtis. The 
validity of the practices as rooted in an eternal Veda was inferred by one's pre­
decessors as is done today. Thus the existence of sruti in which the smrti (such as 
that which enjoins astaka and so on) is rooted is arrived at through inference. The 
Nyaya perspective is that the branch of the Veda that is the root of such rites and 
traditions is presently lost.
Desika's objection to the Prabhakara view is that by not apprehending those 
sruti, simply inferring that their existence, would mean that the provenance of 
these rites is rooted in blind tradition (andhasantananati) and not rooted in sruti 
that is eternal and perceptible.49 Desika's view on this matter is that smrti trad­
itions such as the astaka rituals have their origin in sruti that have been studied by 
men somewhere (kvapi), because it is sruti (srutitvat). Indeed, sruti is the recitation 
in some place of a collection of words with the palate etc. If the condition for 
recitation is due to the recognition of an ear and a speaker, how then can sruti be 
inferred?50
Desika also rejects the Nyaya argument of the rootedness of the tradition of the 
sista-s in lost Vedic sakhas.51 He proposes a distinction between lost (ucchina) sruti 
and dispersed (aprakirna) sruti. He is willing to admit that some branches of the 
Veda, in the present time, in the present place, can be accepted as lost, but he 
cannot agree, if it is said that these sakha-s have been lost in all the lands, for all 
time, because something that is eternal cannot be lost.52 Desika rejects the root­
edness of smrti practices such as astaka simply as tradition (acara) and also objects
to the view of the lost Vedas.53 Both these views go against his definition of sruti as 
the eternal essence of Brahman that preexists eternally and is manifest in a par­
ticular order and uttered in a specific pattern from time immemorial. To engage in 
such exegetical discussions requires a comprehensive interreligious understanding 
and an exhaustive knowledge of one's own tradition as well.
The second illustration taken from Desika's defence of Pancaratra, demonstrates 
that Pancaratra's claims of superiority were severely criticised by opponents since 
certain texts of this smrti tradition claimed supremacy to even the Vedas. For 
instance, in the Sattvata Samhita it is said ‘then not gaining the goal by studying the 
Vedas and its angas, Sandilya (declared) the Pancaratra tantra'.54 Desika follows his 
predecessor Ramanuja in contextualising this statement with reference to the 
bhumavidya section of the Chandogya Upanisad (7.1ff). There, it is said that even 
though Narada is well versed in all the Vedas and the auxiliary sciences, he is still 
ignorant of the self.55 Desika argues that this statement does not mean that this 
upanisad rejects the authority of the whole Vedic tradition, it simply means that 
its teaching alone will lead to self-realisation. Just as texts like this upanisad 
cannot be considered contrary to the Veda, so is the case with Pañcaratra.56 
Finally, Desika ends his defence of Pancaratra by referring to Yamuna's 
Agamapramanya57 and Ramanuja's Brahmasutrabhasya,58 which he says explains 
all these issues and are the foundational texts that prove the authority of the 
Pañcaratra smrti.59 Such statements are only meant to praise Pañcaratra but not 
devalue the Veda.60 Juxtaposing the TMK, with those of his predecessors, Desika 
deftly creates a single curriculum, by resolving contradictions across various texts 
and postulating a single unified category of sabdapramana. To defer to 
sabdapramana in some ways means an ability to utilise it to such exegetical 
ends. This illustration also demonstrates the very important issue of teacher- 
pupil lineage (guruparampara). Desika considers himself a descendent of the lineage 
of important Srivaisnava teachers such as Yamuna, and Ramanuja. Exegetical 
training, teachers, and years of study prepare one to ably defer to sabdapramana 
and are implied in Desika's understanding of deference to scripture. In this sense 
reliance on scripture is a feature of the intellectual activity of a religious commu­
nity as a whole, it is a communal undertaking and is linked to the propagation and 
transmission of a tradition.
Conclusion
Clooney in his seminal article on Hindu theology writes that ‘[r]easoning carried 
forward without regard for authoritative religious sources needs to be distin­
guished from reasoning marked by attention to scripture and other religious 
authorities; the latter is theological reasoning'.61 Visixbadvaita Vedanta's reliance 
on scripture certainly qualifies it as theological discourse. Extrapolating what 
Desika understands as deference to sabdapramana from his discussion on
authoritative scripture, this article has identified certain criteria on which that 
commitment to scripture is predicated in the context of sastraic discourse.
Deference to sabdapramana does not simply mean recognition of certain scrip­
tures as authoritative and valid, and their use but an orientation toward these 
texts motivated by belief in a particular view of reality. In Sravaisnavism this 
would be the acceptance of Visnu as the Brahman of the upanisad, his connection 
to authoritative scripture, and in its propagation. Furthermore, to defer to 
sabdapramana according to Desika requires membership in a community and the 
requisite pedagogical training that confers the authority needed to speak for the 
tradition. Certain aspects such as tradition (sampradaya), lineage (para:apara), in­
tellectual (sastra) discourse, and authority (adhikara) form the very core of defer­
ence to sabdapramana as understood in the Srivaisnava context. Desika's 
understanding of deference to sabdapramana carries with it the issues and concerns 
of a whole tradition and to defer to scripture is not an autonomous endeavour. For 
Desika then, deference to scripture as a characteristic feature of theology would 
include the above-mentioned criteria.
References
Abhyankar, V. S., 1916. Sri Bhasya of Ramanujacarya. Part I & II. Pune: Bombay Sanskrit 
and Prakrit Series.
Adluri, S., 2006. ‘Sruti and Smrti in Ramanuja's Vedanta.' Journal of Vaishnava Studies 15: 
193-220.
Cabezon, J. I., 1999. Buddhist theology in the academy. In: Jackson, R., Makransky, J. (eds). 
Buddhist theology: critical reflections by Buddhist scholars, pp. 25-52. London: Routledge 
Publishers.
Chari, S. M. Srinivasa, 1988. Fundamentals of Visistadvaita Vedanta: a study based on Vedanta 
Desika's Tattvamuktakalapa. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Chemparathy, G., 1972. An Indian rational theology: introduction to Udayana's
Nyayakusumanjali. Vienna: the De Nobili Research Library.
Chemparathy, G., 1987. ‘Meaning and role of the concept of Mahajanaparigraha in the 
ascertainment of the validity of the Veda.' Philosophical essays: professor Anantalal 
Thakur felicitation volume, pp. 67-80. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
Clooney, F. X., 1987. ‘Why the veda has no author: language as ritual in post-modern 
theology.' Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55: 659-84.
Clooney, F. X., 2005a. From person to person: a study of tradition in the Gurupara:parasara 
of Vedanta Desika's Srimat Rahasyatrayasara. In: Squarcini, F. (ed). Boundaries, dy­
namics and construction of traditions in South Asia, pp. 203-24. Firenze: Firenze 
University Press.
Clooney, F. X., 2005b. Restoring ‘Hindu Theology' as a category of Indian intellectual 
discourse. In: Flood, G. (ed). The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, pp. 447-77. 
London: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers.
Dvivedi, Sivaprasad, 1900. SarvarthasiddhiyutaTattvamuktakalapa Venkabanathadesikena 
Pranita. Kasi: Medikal Hal Mudralaya.
Halbfass, W., 1991. Tradition and reflection: Explorations in Indian thought. Albany: State 
University of New York Press.
Lipner, J. J., 1986. The face of truth. The study of meaning and metaphysics in the theology of 
Ramanuja. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Mumme, P. Y., 2009. The Sravais>ava theological dispute: Ma>avalamamuni and Vedanta Desika.
Bangalore: Navbharath Enterprises.
Oberhammer, G., 1971. Yamunamunis Interpretation Von Brahmas+tram 2.2.42-45. Wien: Verlag 
der (Österreichischen Akademie Der Wissenschaften.
Upadhyaya, Padmaprasada, Sastri, Dhundiraja, 1957. Udayana's Nyäyakusumänjali with 
four commentaries—the Bodhina, Prakäsa, Prakäsikä, and Makaranda. Varanasi: 
Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office.
Pollock, S., 2005. The revelation of tradition: sruti, smrti, and the Sanskrit discourse of 
power. In: Squarcini, F. (ed). Boundaries, dynamics, and construction of traditions in South 
Asia, pp. 41-61. Firenze: Firenze University Press.
van Buitenen, J. A. B., 1971. Yamuna's ?gamapramanyam. Madras: Rämänuja Research 
Society.
van Buitenen, J. A. B., 1956. Ramanuja's Vedarthasa:graha. Poona: Deccan College 
Postgraduate and Research Institute.
Varadacharya, K. S., 2004. Tattvamuktakalapa of Srimad Vedanta Desika with commentary 
Sarvankasa. Mysore: Arsha Grantha Prakarshana.
Viraräghaväcärya, U.T., 1972. Bhagavadgatabhasya of Ramanuja with the Tatparyacandrika of 
Vedanta Desika. Madras: Ubhaya Vedanta Granthamala.
Notes
1 In this article, the terms Srιvaisnavism and Visixtädvaita Vedänta are used 
interchangeably.
2 Varadacharya, TMK 1.1-4; Chari 9.
3 yannasmin kvapi naitat (Varadacharya, TMK 5.134).
4 Nyayasiddhanjana, Chari 8.
5 adravya in Visixtädvaita Vedänta encompasses qualities of a substance that cannot 
themselves become substrates for other qualities, such as the three qualities of 
prakrti, sound, touch, colour, and so on (Dvivedi, SS 5.2).
6 TMK 4.111—refutation of the Nyäya claim that validity of Veda is due to its com­
position by a trustworthy person (isvara). TMK 4.112—refutation of the Nyäya view 
that the Veda was at the beginning, undivided into branches. TMK 4.113—argues 
the eternality of the Veda (Varadacharya).
7 For more on Rämänuja and scripture see, Adluri (2006).
8 tasmat karyakaryavyavasthitau upadeyanupadeyavyavasthayam sastram eva tava 
prama>am. dharmasâstretihâsapurânâdyupabpmhitâ veda yad eva purusottamakhyam 
param tattvam tatpranarupam tat praptyupayabhutam ca karma avabodhayanti 
(Vararäghaväcärya, RBhGBh 16.24).
9 Varadacharya, TMK 4.114-115.
10 Halbfass (1991, pp. 23-49).
11 Clooney (1987).
12 Beginning with 4.101, Desika considers and refutes the views of rival schools on the 
nature of language, knowledge, and the Veda (Varadacharya).
13 etadeva vedanam apauruseyatvam nityatvam ca, yat p+rvap+rvoccara>akramajanita 
sa:skarena tameva kramavisesam smptva tenaiva kramenoccaryamanatvam (van 
Buitenen,  139).
14 There are two types of dissolution. A partial dissolution is characterised by the 
destruction of all creation up to, but not inclusive of Brahm@. During complete 
dissolution, all entities including the creator god Brahm@ are absorbed into ViX>u.
15 Lipner (1986, p. 8).
16 Ibid., p. 9.
17 In contrast to Ramanuja, for whom smrti served to augment or corroborate 
(upabp:hana) the meaning of the Veda, Desika, at least in the TMK, simply seeks 
to prove the equivalence between these two categories of sabdapramana, but stops 
short of declaring smrti as apauruseya and nitya. No longer is smrti seen as serving a 
corroborative function, but instead once it is deemed valid, it has the same standing 
as the Veda.
18 drste vedair virodhe smrtipariharanam sutrabhasyadisiddham (Varadacharya, TMK
4.119).
19 tadvan natih puranaprabhrtisu bhavinam sambhavad vibhramadeh syad anyonyam virodhe 
tu iha balaniyatis sattvikadibhedat (TMK 4.119).
20 In the epochs of tamas, the glories of Agni and Siva are praised (Matsya Purana 290.14cd). 
And in the epochs of rajas, the greater glory of Brahma is considered (Matsya Purana 
290.14ef)
Then in the epochs of sattva, the even greater glory of Hari is sung.
In these ages alone, those perfected by means of yoga, will reach the highest goal.
In the mixed ages, that of Sarasvata and the Manes (Matsya Purana 290.15).
21 Halbfass (1991, p. 61).
22 MBh santiparvan 12.339.111; 349.64.
23 Sa:khya and Pasupata with their considerable divergence in doctrines and the path 
to liberation must necessarily be evaluated as invalid. If the Veda, according to 
Visistadvaita, declares that Visnu-Narayana is the highest Brahman who is the ma­
terial and instrumental cause of the universe, the Samkhya claim of pradhana as the 
material cause of the universe cannot be acceptable (Abhyankar, RBrSuBh 2.2.1ff). 
Similarly, the Pasupata claim that the material and instrumental cause as distinct 
and Pasupati as the latter only, is unacceptable in the context of Vedanta 
(Abhyankar, RBrSuBh 2.2.36-39).
24 Visistadvaita's appropriation of Pañcaratra begins with Yamuna and Desika borrows 
some of his arguments from him. For more on Yamuna and Pañcaratra see, van 
Buitenen (1971) and Oberhammer (1971).
25 bh+yasyarthe pradhane vihitamati sattam samsayasca kvacit syat srutya badham na 
rundhe srutisahapabhitir hetvahantavyata ca (Varadacharya, TMK 4.120).
26 pañcrópótrasya kptsnasya vakta narayanah svayam (Dvivedi, SS 4.121).
27 Vararaghavacarya, RBhGBh 4.8.
28 It is unclear if pravrtti should be taken in the sense of Visnu's cosmic actions 
generally such as being the primal teacher to Sañdilya and so on, or specific 
cosmic activities like the incarnations. Although in the case of Krsna, both inter­
pretations apply.
29 dvividha khalu bhagavatah pravptti$ asuramohanartham ósritasamraksanárthañ ca. pan- 
caratre sattvottarajanasamraksa>artham eva pravpttih, ata eva sattvottaras sannilyadaya 
evam tacchastra-pravaktara$ (Dvivedi, SS 4.121).
30 For more on Desika's views on Visnu as the primal teacher see Clooney (2005a, 207-9).
31 tasmad isvarapravartye sarvasminn api siddhante sati kasyacit pañcatatrasya ko visesah
(Dvivedi, SS 4.123).
32 atah kvacit pramanye pañcaratrasyaiva pramaanyam bhagavatproktatvat sandilyadisattvot- 
taradhikari-parigrahat vedavirodhabhavat anyasmadapi satasah pratipaditat vaisamyat 
siddhyati (Dvivedi, SS 4.123).
33 apramanatvena tantrantaranisvarabuddhisthani pramanatvena pañcamtram iti (Dvivedi,
SS 4.123).
34 isvarasya sarvajnatvena tadbuddhisthatvam vedanam buddhagamadinamapi samanam. 
naitavata tatra samyam. tadvad atrapiti bhavah (SS 4.123).
35 Mumme (2009, p. 182).
36 Ibid., pp. 167-84.
37 Chemparathy (1972).
38 Due to the ambiguous meaning of mahat, mahajana can have a qualitative or quan­
titative connotation, as ‘wise men' or ‘a great number of men', respectively. 
Udayana, however, retains both connotations and interprets the term as
bahutvatisaya—many eminent persons. See Chemparathy (1987, pp. 67-80).
39 Chemparathy (1987) examines Udayana's argument on this matter in detail.
40 Nyayakusumanjali (NK), stabaka 2, pp. 302-3.
41 I translate mahantah qualitatively as this is Desika's intention.
42 preksavanto mahantah parijagphur imam sadharm angair anantam (Varadacharya, TMK 
4.114).
43 nettham prasrtir (Varadacharya, TMK 4.114).
44 Dvivedi, SS 4.114.
45 na hyatra alasyadir nimittam. duhkhamayakarmapradhanatvat. napyanyatra siddha- 
pramanye' bhyupaye' nadhikarena asmin ananyagatikataya anyapravesah. paraih 
pujyanamapyatrapravesat. napi bhakxyapeyadyadvaitaragah, tad vibhagavyavasth 
aparatvat. napi kutarkabhyasa ‘hitavyamohah. akumaram pravrtteh. napi sambhavad 
vipralimbhapasannasamsargah pitradikramena pravarttanat (Padmaprasada and Sastri, 
302; Chemparathy translation 1987, p. 75).
46 upadhi or upadhi is in the singular even though it refers to a list of limitations. It is 
singular with the intention of relation to each one of the limitations, ‘upadhir iti 
ekavacanam pratyekanvayatatparyena'' (Varadacharya 2004, p. 669).
47 dpsyante gatyabhαvo niyatisu laghima vancanam tarkamoho vrttisvasthyadi 
caisamupadhiradhigame vaiparatyam tu vede (Varadacharya, TMK 4.114).
48 Pollock (2005, pp. 51-52).
49 Varadacharya, TMK 4.117; Dvivedi, SS 4.117.
50 srutitve nityanumeyatvavyaghatat talvadivyaparaih kvacid uccaryamane
varnasamghatavisesa eva hi srutih. tasya kathan nityanumeyatvam uccaranadasayam 
vaktrsrotror upalambhat (Dvivedi, SS 4.117).
51 sakhocchedastv idanim iha yadi sa matah sarvatas ced asiddhih (Dvivedi, TMK 4.117).
52 Varadacharya, TMK 4.118; Dvivedi, SS 4.118.
53 Fn 18, in Pollock (2005, p. 52).
54 tarhi sangesu vedesu nixbham alabhamanah sαndilyah pancaratratantram adhitavan 
(Dvivedi, SS 4.121).
55 Ch Up 7.1.2-3.
56 Also mentioned in Abhyankar, RBrSuBh 2.2.43.
57 van Buitenen (1971).
58 These issues are treated in Rämänuja's Brahmautrabhasya 2.2.40-43 and Yämuna's 
?gama-pramanyam. Also see Oberhammer (1971) on Yämuna's interpretation of said 
Brahma Sutras.
59 etaccagampramanye bhasyadau ca vistarenanusamdheyam (Dvivedi, SS 4.122).
60 Also mentioned in Abhyankar, RBrSuBh 2.2.43.
61 Clooney (2005b, p. 449). His discussion of substantive issues that characterise the­
ology is sufficiently broad to include Buddhist theology as well, see Cabezon (1999).
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